Does moral play equilibrate?
- Author(s)
- Immanuel Bomze, Werner Schachinger, Jorgen Weibull
- Abstract
Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between players of arbitrary degrees of morality. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter examples.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Research Platform Governance of digital practices, Research Network Data Science
- External organisation(s)
- Stockholm School of Economics
- Journal
- Economic Theory
- Volume
- 71
- Pages
- 305-315
- No. of pages
- 11
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4
- Publication date
- 01-2020
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 101015 Operations research
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/b87f8ce4-c1b7-4d0a-97ea-b26745639397