Does moral play equilibrate?

Author(s)
Immanuel Bomze, Werner Schachinger, Jorgen Weibull
Abstract

Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between players of arbitrary degrees of morality. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter examples.

Organisation(s)
Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Research Platform Governance of digital practices, Research Network Data Science
External organisation(s)
Stockholm School of Economics
Journal
Economic Theory
Volume
71
Pages
305-315
No. of pages
11
ISSN
0938-2259
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4
Publication date
01-2020
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
101015 Operations research
Keywords
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/does-moral-play-equilibrate(b87f8ce4-c1b7-4d0a-97ea-b26745639397).html